ii.
One must go surprisingly far afield to find major thinkers who unambiguously hold, as I do, that the introspection of current conscious experience is both (i) possible, important, necessary for a full life, and central to the development of a full scientific understanding of the mind, and (ii) highly untrustworthy. In Eastern meditative traditions, I think this is a commonplace. Also the fiercest advocates of introspective training in the first era of scientific psychology and "phenomenology" (circa 1900) endorsed both claims-especially E. B. Titchener.
3 Both the meditators and Titchener, though, take comfort in optimism about introspection "properly" conducted-so (Chuang Tzu [1964] ). For Montaigne, see "Apology for Raymond Sebond" (1948 [1580 ). Sanches' 
s brief treatment of the understanding of the mind in That Nothing
Is Known (1988 Known ( [1581 , especially 243-45 [57-59] ) is at most only a partial exception to this tendency. So also is Unger (1975, 3, sec. 9) , who seems to envision only the possibility of linguistic error about current experience and whose skepticism in this instance seems to turn principally upon an extremely demanding criterion for knowledge. Huet's Against Cartesian Philosophy (2003 [1694 ) is nicely explicit in extending its skepticism to internal matters of ongoing thought, though the examples and arguments differ considerably from mine here. (Titchener 1899) and his Experimental Psychology (Titchener 1901-5) . I discuss Titchener's views Churchland (1985 Churchland ( , 1988 puts it on a par with the accuracy of sense perception. Daniel Dennett (2002) , Armstrong 1963; Churchland 1988 -even Kornblith 1998 ing with a careful eye to distinguish error about current conscious experience from other sorts of error. See also, recently: Shoemaker 1994; Lycan 1996; Dretske 2000; Jack and Shallice 2001; Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2004 Goldman , 2006 Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2005; and most of the essays collected in Gertler 2003, among many others. Gertler (2001) and Chalmers (2003) see Schwitzgebel 2007b. 7 . I see no necessary conflict between the current view of introspection and views on which conscious experience involves a "same order" (for example, Kriegel 2006 ) or "higher-order" (for example, Rosenthal 1986 Lycan 1996) I do reject a strongly "self-presentational" view of consciousness (as, perhaps, in Horgan, Tienson, and Graham 2005 Dennett 2001, 982. 16 . In addition to this type of "refrigerator light" error (Thomas 1999) , an implicit analogy between visual experience and pictures or photographs may also sway us to overascribe detail in visual experience (see Noë 2004) . Consider also Dennett 1969, 139-41. Dennett (1991) , O'Regan (1992) , Mack and Rock (1998) , Rensink, O'Regan, and Clark (2000) , and Blackmore (2002) Titchener [1909 Titchener [ , 1910 Siewert (1998) , Horgan and Tienson (2002) , Wilson (2003) , Pitt (2004) , and Robinson (2005) . See also Aristotle De Anima (1961), 431a; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007, 89-90. Compare Hintikka 1962; Burge 1988 Burge , 1996 27. For example, James 1981 [1890 Titchener 1912, 491; Hurlburt 1990, chap. 2. 28. Epistemologists often define "reliability" so that only the first type of failure counts as a failure of reliability (for example, Goldman [1986] , who calls the second sort of failure a lack of "power" 29. See Gordon 1995; McGeer 1996; Moran 2001; Bar-On 2004; Lawlor 2006 . 30. Ericsson and Simon (1993 ) are optimistic about the accuracy of descriptions of one's thought processes when one "thinks aloud," expressing the thought concurrently with having it. They are considerably less optimistic about retrospective reports if the subject is not primed and trained in advance to express and reflect on her thoughts as they occur. Burge (1996) Titchener (1901-5) , and in the recent explorations of psychologists like Hurlburt (1990; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel 2007) 33 Indeed, I suspect the opposite is nearer the truth: Our judgments about the world to a large extent drive our judgments about our experience. Properly so, since the former are the more secure.
See especially his Primer of Psychology

), against advocates of "imageless thought" (notably the "Würzburg group," whose work is reviewed in Humphrey 1951). Recent philosophers participating in the controversy include
phenomenology of thought and others do not, then someone is quite profoundly mistaken about her own stream of experience. Disagreement here is no matter of fine nuance. If there is such a thing as a conscious thought, then presumably we have them all the time. How could you go looking for them and simply not find them? Conversely, if there's no distinctive phenomenology of thought, how could you introspect and come to believe that there is-that is, invent a whole category of conscious experiences that simply don't exist? Such fundamental mistakes almost beggar the imagination; they plead for reinterpretation as disagreements only in language or theory, not real disagreements about the phenomenology itself. I don't think that's how the participants in these disputes see it, though; and, for me at least, the temptation to recast it this way dissipates when I attempt the introspection myself. Think of the Prince of Wales. Now consider: Was there something it was like to have that thought? Set aside any visual or auditory imagery you may have had. The question is: Was there something further in your experience, something besides the imagery, something that might qualify as a distinctive phenomenology of thinking? Try it again, if you like. Is the answer 19. These and related poll results were published at consc.net/neh/ pollresults.html (accessed May 2005). I am inclined to read the disagreement between the "no phenomenology of thought" and the "imagery exhausts it" camps as a disagreement about terms or concepts rather than about phenomenology-a disagreement about whether having an image should count as "thinking." However, I see no similarly easy terminological explanation of the central dispute. As I recall (though this number is not recorded on the Web site), only two participants (Maja Spener and I) said they didn't know.
so obvious you can't imagine someone going wrong about it? Is it as obvious as that your desk has drawers
